Introduction
Revolutions are unsettling and dangerous. They upset social orders and reshape political landscapes. Real revolutions change things fundamentally. It is no wonder then that the repeated insistence by various authorities that the development of nanotechnology represents as large a technological revolution as the invention of the internal combustion engine, electricity, the silicon chip, or recombinant DNA technology (Roco and Bainbridge 2001, pp. 262-272), should raise alarm at how our world will be transformed by this next putative revolution. An obvious question to ask about the prospect of revolution is who will gain and who will lose if a revolution occurs? In a world already marked by enormous divides between rich and poor, both within and between nations, it is natural to wonder how nanotechnologies will affect these inequalities. A number of authors have already raised concerns about the prospect that the development of nanotechnologies will be shaped by-and may even exacerbate-these inequalities leading to what has been called a "nanodivide" (Arnall 2003, pp. 37-38; Court et al 2004; Meridian Institute 2005; National Academies Forum 2006; Yonas and Picraux 2002, p. 42) .
I am sympathetic to concerns that an unreflective race to embrace nanotechnologies will further exacerbate existing political and economic inequalities.
1 However, I believe that a proper assessment of the likelihood and consequences of any nanodivide will be impossible unless we acknowledge the complexity of the issues expressed in this idea. There are in fact a number of different divides that nanotechnologies might open up or exacerbate between the wealthy and the impoverished and between the powerful and powerless both within and between nations. There is not one but many "nanodivides". There is the divide between those who will have access to nanotechnologies and those who will not. There is the divide between those who will manufacture and profit from nanotechnologies and those who will not. There is the divide between those who will benefit from nanotechnologies and those who will not.
Finally, there is the divide between those who will make decisions about the development and shape of nanotechnologies and those who will not. Thus there are four questions that arise about the social, economic and political institutions that are likely to surround nanotechnologies in the future: a question of access, a question of profit, a question of benefit, and a question of control. Each of these questions may be asked about the distribution of the relevant good both between and within nations.
Of these four questions, the question of benefit and the question of control are ultimately the most important when considering the ethics of the development and application of nanotechnologies. However, recognising the existence of the other three divides reveals the question of who benefits from nanotechnologies to be more complex than first appears.
Similarly, the question of the distribution of the control of nanotechnologies cannot be adequately addressed until we have disentangled it from the other three questions and also seen how it relates to them. Moreover, different groups are likely to be concerned with some of these divides more than others, depending on their current circumstances and interests.
Individual consumers may be worried about whether they will be able to access nanotechnologies and/or whether they will benefit from it. Manufacturers and investors are likely to be interested in whether they will profit from it. The more organised political actors in the debate are largely concerned with the question of control. Separating out these issues therefore allows us to speak more directly to the concerns of these different parties.
In what follows, then, I will make some brief remarks about each of these divides and their prospects before turning to consider the ethical and regulatory choices we should make if we wish to minimise the likely impacts of each of them. Before I can do either however, I need to make a number of preliminary remarks about the significance of conceptualising the social, political, and economic impacts of nanotechnologies in terms of "divides".
Thinking about a divided world
Thinking about nanotechnologies in terms of the divides they may open up foregrounds at least four important issues regarding the interaction between technology and inequality.
First, thinking in terms of divides draws our attention to the positional nature of many social, economic, and political goods in the modern world. Positional goods are goods the value of which depends upon how much of the same good other people possess. If it is divides we are concerned about then it is a change in the relative positions of parties which is important rather than whether they benefit when considered individually and independently. This has two consequences for technology forecasting. A) It is harder to predict the impact of a technology on the relative position of parties because in order to do so we need to know its effect on multiple parties rather than just one. B) It means that technologies that have large benefits for many people may nevertheless worsen these divides. These key facts about the ultimate impact of technology are often forgotten in the enthusiasm for the immediate benefits that technologies can bring to those who have access to them.
Second, it foregrounds the significant questions of distributive justice that inevitably arise when we consider how our world might change as the results of some new technological revolution. People on different sides of political and economic divides may live in very different worlds. Yet which side of the divide they are on often reflects only a mere accident of birth. A divided world is in all probability an unjust world. Those of us who are concerned that nanotechnologies should contribute to a more just-and not just a more "high-tech"-future therefore have reason to consider how we might try to make a just distribution of these goods more likely.
Third, it places the question of our nanotechnological future in the context of harsh truths about our existing political and economic circumstances which involve tremendous divides between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless. The existence and resilience of these divides should serve as a reminder that "better" technology does not always lead straightforwardly to a better world. Poverty, famine, and injustice are for the most part not technological problems. If there is poverty and famine in Africa today this is not because the technology to eliminate it has yet to be invented; it is because political, economic, and social factors have prevented the technologies that have by-and-large eliminated these phenomena from Europe doing so in Africa. Again, this is a lesson of which we need to constantly remind ourselves when thinking about the likely impacts of nanotechnologies.
Four, recognition of the existing divides encourages us to think about the extent to which nanodivides are likely to occur as a straightforward consequence of existing inequalities.
Although I have described the various nanodivides as divides between those who will or won't have access to, profit from, benefit from, or control nanotechnologies, it would be a mistake to think of these divides solely as something which might develop in the future and which we should be concerned to avoid. Insofar as nanotechnologies represent an evolutionary continuation of contemporary technological trends towards miniaturisation it will be shaped by those divides between the rich and poor both within and between nations that already exist in relation to technology. The nanodivide may simply be the existing divide with "nano" in front of it. Indeed, it is a commonplace at conferences on nanotechnologies to hear that nanotechnologies are already "here": to the extent this is the case, so too are various
nanodivides! Yet for all this discussion of divides, I have yet to say very much about precisely who might be being divided from whom. Answering this question requires us to pause briefly to consider the nature of global political and economic inequality more generally.
The political geography of inequality
The ways in which we describe the world and its political and economic divisions at a given historical moment reflect both the nature of those divisions and also our perceptions of them, which are in turn shaped by our theory of historical development more generally. "East"
versus "West", "First World" versus "Third World", "Developed Nations" versus "Developing Nations" (and not to mention "Least Developed Countries"), "Centre" versus "Periphery", "Global North" versus "Global South"-each of these reflects a different historical period and a different set of ideas about the important divisions in our world and about the forces driving economic "development". In what follows, I am going to adopt the contemporary terminology of a global "North-South" divide to describe the gap which has opened between wealthy industrialised Northern European and North American nations and impoverished masses of Africa and Latin America.
The idea of a North-South divide has always been as much political as geographical with some "advanced" nations in the geographic "South" (for instance, Australia and Japan) typically being grouped with the North and some geographically "Northern" countries which are lagging behind (for instance, some of the former Soviet republics) often being grouped with the South. The artificial nature of this division becomes especially important when we consider the future development of nanotechnologies. The global distribution of spending on nanotechnology research draws attention to phenomena that is increasingly apparent across a number of areas of technological and economic change, which is the development of a significant group of "middle" nations which share some of the features of both North and
South. An important group of Asian and Southeast Asian Nations, including India, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia are investing heavily in nanotechnology research, as is Brazil in South America (Court et al 2004; Hassan 2005; Salamanca-Buentello et al 2005; Schulte 2005a ). The high rates of economic growth achieved by these nations as well as the amount of money they are investing in "high-technology" suggests that these nations should be grouped with the North when thinking about any putative nanodivide. At the same time, their population demographics and large rural populations suggest that they should be considered part of the South. The significance of this grouping should be obvious once we realise that between them they contain the majority of the world's population.
The conclusions we reach about any global nanodivides will therefore be shaped in a large part by how we think about these nations. In particular, if we think of them as part of the "South" then the scale of their involvement in nanotechnology research seems to suggest that there is little danger of a North-South nanodivide (Hassan 2005 ; National Academies Forum 2006, p. 28).
However, this conclusion would be too swift, for two reasons.
Firstly, the division between the "North" and "South" is a division within nations and this North-South divide is especially pronounced within this middle group, especially within India and China. It is entirely possible that these nations could join with the "North" in developing nanotechnologies while at the same time leaving this internal divide untouched or even exacerbating it (UNESCO 2006, p. 12 
A question of access
The question of access is perhaps the first question that occurs to us when thinking about the future of nanotechnology. Will a significant and long-lasting divide appear between those who have access to nanotechnologies and those who do not? Where it occurs this divide will separate consumers and producers who can afford nanotechnologies from others who are unable to afford them or otherwise cannot access them.
Importantly, the distribution of access to nanotechnologies is distinct from that of the distribution of either profit or benefit. However, the question of access and the question of benefit are linked in a very straightforward way. Those who are unable to access nanotechnologies are unlikely to be able to benefit from them. Indeed, as I will discuss further below, given that benefit in the real world is often a matter of change in relative position those who are unable to access nanotechnologies to which others do have access may suffer real harms as a result. On the other hand access to nanotechnologies does not guarantee benefit, especially given the positional nature of many of the goods that flow from access to new technology. Access and profit are different matters largely because access concerns the use and applications of nanotechnology whereas profit is likely to result primarily from its control and manufacture.
Of the nanodivides I have identified, the "access nanodivide" is likely to be least pronounced and most easily overcome. Once developed, many nanotechnologies are widely predicted to be cheap to produce (Saxl 2006, pp. 46-7; Schulte 2005b; Theis 2002) . The manufacture of products involving nanotechnology will occur in the same "free economic zones" and facilities in China, Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have flooded global markets with cheap clothing, household goods, and consumer electronics in the last decade. As a result, the access to nanotechnologies is indeed, as some of its early proponents argued, likely to "trickle-down" (Drexler 1986; Drexler, Peterson, and Pergamit 1993) . This in turn suggests that (some of) the benefits of nanotechnologies may be widely available to a significant percentage of the global population simultaneously as, or at least without too much delay after, they appear on markets in the wealthy North.
I must, however, acknowledge two significant qualifications to this apparently optimistic conclusion.
Firstly, when considering the distribution of access to nanotechnologies it is useful to distinguish between "high" or "bespoke" nanotechnologies and "low" or "mass"
nanotechnologies. "High" or "bespoke" nanotechnologies will be research intensive to design and manufacture and will be produced in small amounts for critical applications. Designer dendrimers are an obvious example here (Cheng and Pun 2006) . "Low" or "mass" nanotechnologies will be technology that is employed as a matter of routine in a wide range of applications especially in manufacturing, packaging, industrial chemistry, and material science. Access to "high" nanotechnologies is likely to be restricted to citizens of wealthy Northern nations and wealthy elites in the South for the foreseeable future.
Secondly, while "low" nanotechnologies are likely to be widely distributed around the globe, a significant proportion of the population in the South may be denied access even to these.
Millions of people around the world still don't have access to the basic "technology" required to ensure clean drinking water. I can see little reason to believe that even low-cost nanotechnologies will succeed in overcoming the social, economic, and political barriers which have restricted access to existing technologies in much of the global South.
There are two arguments for regulation to reduce divides in access to nanotechnologies.
Where access is linked to substantial benefit, there are reasons of justice to try to ensure that access to nanotechnologies is available to all. As this is primarily an argument about benefit, I
will discuss it below.
There is, however, an argument for regulating to ensure access to some forms of nanotechnology that is independent of any material benefit it may provide, which refers to the role played by rights in establishing political equality and solidarity. Sometimes it is important to ensure that citizens have access to a technology primarily because having a right of access is a mark of one's status as a citizen. In Australia and some of the European social democracies, for instance, right of access to a certain standard of medical care comes with citizenship. Those who do not have such access are thereby marked out as being as less than full citizens. This remains true even if particular popular forms of treatment accord little benefit. Their symbolic or status value is sufficient to establish that citizens should be guaranteed a right access. In the future something of this sort may come to be true of some forms of nanotechnology. In particular, if developments in nanotechnologies lead to technologies of human enhancement becoming available then there may be an argument on the basis of a concern for the equal status of citizens for preventing any substantial divide in access to these technologies developing.
One distinct and important question of access concerns access to military nanotechnologies.
Much research into nanotechnologies is funded by the military and nanotechnologies are predicted to have significant applications in the areas of protective materials and "improved" 
A question of profit
When governments, corporations, and industry groups consider the future of nanotechnology, perhaps the main question that concerns them is how to ensure that they do not miss out on the economic bonanza that is widely predicted to flow from the development of nanotechnologies (Canton 2001; DeFrancesco 2003; Hood 2004, p. A742; NSTC 1999, p. 2; Roco 2005) . That is, they do not wish to be left on the wrong side of a divide between those who will profit from nanotechnologies and those who will not.
I am choosing here to distinguish the question of profit from the question of benefit by treating profit as a narrowly economic notion and benefit as an all-things-considered judgment. I have deliberately separated out the question of profit precisely because government and industry have been so concerned about it. It is worth considering independently for that reason even if-as I believe-we should ultimately be most concerned about the distribution of profits only in so far as it affects the distribution of benefits.
Those who will profit most from nanotechnologies will be those who own the intellectual One suspects that an awareness of this fact is driving the investment of large sums in nanotechnology research by corporations such as IBM, DuPont, Xerox, and Motorola (Berube 2006, p. 221) . The fact that the development and production of nanotechnologies will require both cutting edge science and state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities suggests that it is likely to be dominated by these very same corporations, which are in turn likely to reap most of the profits from nanotechnologies.
It is true that the development of nanotechnologies may lead to a small number of new players arriving on the global economic scene. New technologies sometimes create new markets which existing producers may be slow to recognise or enter. Occasionally small firms can develop strategic portfolios of intellectual property essential to the application of new technologies, or new business models especially suited to success in these new markets, and in this way grow to take their place alongside the existing corporate giants. However, in this regard, I believe that nanotechnology will, at least in the short-to-medium term, be a much less disruptive technology than either the IT or the biotech revolution. The IT revolution greatly accelerated a shift towards the production and consumption of "post material" products in advanced economies and led to the creation of significant new communications infrastructure, which in turn made possible new models of marketing and distribution, and consequently the development of new business models more generally. While the biotech revolution has thus far failed to live up to its advertised potential, in theory recombinant DNA technology should make it possible for small research laboratories to produce dramatic breakthroughs in the area of pharmaceuticals and agricultural products and thus radically transform the relevant markets. In contrast, nanotechnology is for the most part much more clearly an extension of existing manufacturing processes in the chemicals and electronics industries, which will continue to be dominated by existing corporations (ETC Group 2004, p.
4; Garces and Cornell 2001).
At a national level, the capacity to develop and produce nanotechnologies also depends upon a nation's researchers having access to the cutting edge of research in the physical sciences and its manufacturers having access to state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities. For this reason I think we should expect that a sharp North-South divide will indeed emerge in relation to the distribution of the profits from nanotechnologies. Most nations in the South have neither the depth of scientific expertise, nor the manufacturing capacity, to play any significant role in the development and manufacture of nanotechnologies.
As noted above, a possible exception to this observation concerns the situation of an important group of "Southern" nations who are investing heavily in nanotechnologies.
Consequently, it is likely that profits from nanotechnologies will indeed flow to firms based in these countries, and in particular in China, India, and Korea. However, as was also argued above, this does not alter the fact that a much larger group of nations in the South are each likely to receive little, if any, profit from nanotechnologies nor does it establish that the profits that will flow to firms based in these nano-focused Southern nations will flow on to be distributed to their population at large. In both these regards, then, the enthusiasm of these nations for nanotechnology research and investment is likely to leave a large part of the North-South divide in the distribution of the profits of nanotechnologies essentially untouched.
Arguments that we should try to address the international distribution of profits from nanotechnologies are most compelling when interpreted as motivated by a concern to achieve an equitable distribution of benefits and I will therefore treat them below.
Whether a concern to avoid a divide in the distribution of profits within nations provides any grounds for regulation depends on our attitudes towards oligopolies and also towards inequalities in the distribution of wealth. It is possible that a few large corporations might between them establish an effective oligopoly on nanotechnology by virtue of possession of the relevant intellectual property portfolios or by generating economies of scale on the basis of a high market share. Should this turn out to be the case and if we also are concerned about the effects of oligopoly then there might be some case for regulating to ensure competitive markets. If one is inclined, as I am, to believe that large inequalities of wealth are themselves prima facie unjust and also destructive of social solidarity this would also provide a reason to take action to try to reduce any divide in the distribution of profits. The application of this latter argument is, however, hardly unique to nanotechnology.
Finally, it is worth observing that a concern for profit actually supports a case for regulation of nanotechnologies without any consideration of the dangers of inequality in this area. As argued elsewhere in this collection, the successful development of both markets for, and industries producing, nanotechnologies will require governments to regulate in areas such as material standards, product safety, environmental health, product liability, and intellectual property. It may prove easier to promote discussion between the relevant stakeholders about the possibility of regulation on the basis of the other divides once it is established that some regulation is necessary in order to establish global markets in nanotechnologies at all.
A question of benefit.
It seems to me that the question of benefit is ultimately the most important of the questions described above. It is this divide which should be of most concern to those thinking about a nanotechnological future. Our goal should be to ensure that everyone benefits from the nanotechnology revolution. Unfortunately, as discussed above, there is little evidence to suggest that the nanotechnological revolution will be any more successful than any of the previous technological "revolutions" at producing benefits primarily, or even equally, for those who are currently most disadvantaged. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the distribution of the benefits of nanotechnologies will be shaped by existing divides in political and economic power so as to ensure the replication of those divides. When a powerful tool comes along, those who are already powerful try to make sure that they are the ones in whose hands it will rest. For this reason, I believe it to be naive to hold that the primary use to which nanotechnology will be put will be to alleviate poverty, famine, and disease. Instead, it is likely to be devoted to applications which can be sold to consumers in wealthy industrialised nations. Certainly, current evidence suggests that this will be the case, as existing applications of nanotechnology are for the most part restricted to consumer electronics, some advanced industrial processes, and cosmetics, with the technologies that might be more relevant to the global South being as yet only a promise for the future ( There are three further arguments that bear directly on this possibility.
It is clear that nanotechnology has enormous
First, the ultimate metrics in which we should evaluate the benefits offered by nanotechnologies are happiness or well-being. Unless a nanotechnology promotes these goods we cannot judge it to benefit people. This also means that measures of economic growth or material progress are only relevant to this assessment insofar as they reflect changes in the actual happiness or well-being of individuals. 2 Unfortunately, many discussions of the benefits of nanotechnologies settle for an account of their economic benefits without discussing the further question of their human impacts.
Second, there is an argument, often implicit rather than explicit in discussions about nanotechnologies, either that technological progress in general inevitably leads to social and economic progress, or that nanotechnologies in particular can be expected inevitably to generate such progress (Meridian Institute 2005, p. 17; NSTC 1999, p. 8) .
The former of these claims is a larger philosophical claim than I can hope to properly consider here. I will have to be content with two observations. A) This belief is, I think, widely if not necessarily consciously shared by a large number of those thinking and writing about nanotechnologies, and is, I suspect, in part responsible for the vehemence of the response the suggestion that technology might be part of the problem rather than solution is often met with.
It is therefore deserving of further attention elsewhere. B) The observations made earlier about the resilience of political and economic inequalities in the face of technological change thus far go a long way to establishing that whatever the relationship between technological and economic and social progress is, it is not one of inevitability.
The latter claim, that nanotechnologies have some special power in this regard, was made explicitly by some of the early enthusiasts for nanotechnology, who thought that it would fundamentally change the existing political and/or economic order by ushering in a postscarcity world (Drexler 1986; Drexler, Peterson, and Pergamit 1993) . This particular claim seems wildly optimistic. Nanotechnologies will not fundamentally change the existing economic order, which will remain capitalist, although with a significant Keynesian component disguised as a military industrial complex, and marked by savage inequalities. Nor is it likely to fundamentally change the existing political order. The nanotechnology revolution is likely to have much less democratic potential than either of the "green" or "information" revolutions, which themselves have notably failed to redistribute political power in any fundamental way. While computers offered to (but haven't) decentralise decision-making and the Green Revolution offered to empower the poor by feeding the world (but hasn't), putative benefits offered by nanotechnologies are either these very same benefits or are other democratic consequences of the economic gains that are supposed to flow from the alleged ubiquity of nanotechnology. As I noted above, though, access and benefit are not the same thing. Claims that nanotechnology will change the world by ushering in new political circumstances, then, rest on claims about benefits which are themselves precisely what needs to be established.
The third argument that is relevant to the overall assessment of the likely distribution of the benefits of nanotechnologies concerns the relative nature of benefits, outlined above. If some benefit from nanotechnology while others do not, those who do not may actually be significantly worse off than they were before. It may even be true that some of those who do benefit from nanotechnology will ultimately be worse off if others benefit more. Inequality itself may generate negative externalities.
Of course, this is only true in so far as the benefits offered by nanotechnologies are positional goods. Many of them will not be. Access to clean drinking water, for instance, doesn't lose its value just because other people have more. Most health improvements are benefits to those who experience them regardless of the distribution of these goods. To the extent that nanotechnology which offers these benefits becomes widely available it will contribute to the well-being of people in the South without thereby widening any nanodivide.
On the other hand, many of the economic benefits forecast to result from nanotechnology clearly are positional. This is especially true of the competitive advantages that are supposed goods that the South produces (ETC Group 2004). I am not entirely convinced of this particular claim, as I expect that demand for agricultural products will remain high in any foreseeable global order. However, that the introduction of nanotechnologies will have some effect on the balance of trade between nations and that this will generate both winners and losers is incontrovertible. The fact that groups have some access to nanotechnology is no guarantee that they will not be losers.
While nanotechnologies holds out the promise of significant benefits for the South, in part because they are likely to be widely accessible, there is a pressing danger that they will also further widen existing divide between the standard of living in the global North and global
South. Concern about the prospect of a nanodivide therefore provides reason to consider trying to alter these dynamics through legislation, regulation, or other political mechanisms.
Preventing a significant North-South nanodivide in the benefits of nanotechnologies from emerging would require two things. It would require a concerted effort to ensure that those nanotechnologies which might offer real benefits to the South were researched and developed, to ensure that these technologies were made widely available in the South, and to overcome the political and economic barriers that have prevented previous technologies from producing benefits in the South (Salamanca -Buentello et al 2005) . More controversially, it would also require a willingness to restrict or delay access to those nanotechnologies which are likely to produce only substantial positional goods for the North. This latter project will obviously be an unpopular one. However the difficulties involved in the latter project must be placed alongside those involved in the former and this comparison suggests that for the short-tomedium term at least restricting access in the North is likely to be more practicable than guaranteeing access in the South. Unfortunately, that one unlikely option is more likely than another does not mean that either will eventuate. The political difficulties involved in either of these projects are such that there is currently little ground to believe that the existing NorthSouth nanodivide will not worsen as the technologies develop further.
A question of control
It is an oft neglected truth about freedom that we are less free where others possess power over us even if they never use that power to our disadvantage, or indeed at all. Benevolent dictators are still dictators and their subjects remain enslaved even if happy to be so (Pettit 1999 ). The question of who controls powerful technologies which affect the circumstances of our daily life is therefore an important one even where we do not suspect that this control will be used to our immediate disadvantage. It seems to me that concerns expressed about who is likely to benefit from nanotechnologies often actually reflect questions about who is likely control them. Of course, control of a technology is often used to determine who will benefit from it, so while in theory inequalities in control of a technology need not necessarily lead to inequalities in the benefits thereof in practice these things do usually go together.
Sadly, again, all the indicators are that unless a concerted effort is made to avoid it, a substantial divide will open up internationally in relation to control of nanotechnologies.
Unlike access, control of a technology does not "trickle down". It is the nature of political and economic elites to defend the basis of their power and also to attempt to extend it into new contexts. I am not offering a conspiracy theory here; this is both sound business practice and also realist defence of the national interest. The decisions which will shape the future of nanotechnologies and applications will be made in corporate boardrooms, research laboratories, and government committees in the North. Even if research institutions in the North devote a percentage of their efforts to developing nanotechnologies to benefit the South control of these technologies will still rest with the North. The direction of the flow of information and technology is likely to be very much from the global North to the global South (Hassan 2005, p. 66; Meridian Institute 2005, pp. 14-15) .
Again, I must note a significant caveat relating to the involvement of India and China, etc, in nanotechnology research and development. These nations may have a significant influence over the development of nanotechnology. However, the same observations made earlier about the development of a divide in the benefits of nanotechnology apply; this does not constitute any fundamental challenge to the development of a significant North-South divide.
Fortunately the question of who will control nanotechnologies is, of all the questions discussed here, the one to which the answer is most open. That is, if we made a concerted effort, it would be possible to substantially alter who controlled nanotechnology. If a decision were made to try to prevent a nanodivide opening in relation to the control of this technology, legislating or regulating with this goal in mind would just be to exercise control. The question then would be who was exercising this control. Unfortunately, avoiding a North-South divide in relation to control is likely to be significantly harder to achieve than would be establishing public control over nanotechnology in the wealthy North.
There is, it must be emphasised, a certain urgency to this question at the moment. When technologies are first being developed and are taking form the decisions made about them will often determine who controls them and how, for several decades at least. Thus the current debate about who should control nanotechnology (and how) is crucially important for the future of these technologies (Arnall 2003, p. 4) . If we wish to avoid a nanodivide in control we would do better to act sooner rather than later. If we wait too long before attempting this we may find that control over nanotechnology has consolidated in the hands of the powerful such that we will be unable to prise it from them.
What is required to prevent a nanodivide in control is to ensure that those in the global South have as much power to determine development and application of nanotechnologies as do those in the global North. It is thus fundamentally a question about power and democracy.
Avoiding a nanodivide would involve asserting democratic control over the development and application of nanotechnology and empowering the South in relation to the decisions about nanotechnology which will affect them (Court et al 2004; Meridian Institute 2005 ).
An important observation here is that "consultation" is not the same thing as control. There is a tendency in the literature about the social impacts of nanotechnology to think that the need for public control over nanotechnology can be met by conceding that it is important to "listen to the public". Reports on nanotechnology policy therefore often emphasise the need for extensive public consultation (Arnall, 2003; ETC Group 2004; Roco and Bainbridge 2001, p. 12; RS-RAE 2004, pp. 62-67; National Academies Forum 2006; UNESCO 2006 ). Yet, consultation and control are subtly, but crucially, different things (Balbus 2005) . Consultation, no matter how well motivated, careful, and extensive, leaves power in the hands of those who-having consulted-make the decision.
3 Control is about making decisions. Reducing a North-South nano divide in relation to control of nanotechnologies will therefore require more than consulting the South about their needs and desires-it will require handing over some of the power to make decisions about the future of various nanotechnologies.
It is also important to recognise that control by bodies made up of representatives of governments of the Southern nations may be at best a partial remedy to the development of a North-South nanodivide in control. The North-South divide is replicated within the nations of the South, with those in positions of political power typically themselves members of the global North, educated in the universities of the North, and with access to wealth and privileges which are not available to rural populations in their nation. Obviously, we should not wait until political power has been equalised before trying to reduce any North-South divide in control of nanotechnology. However, the existence of a North-South divide within the South points to the need to try to devolve control over nanotechnologies to bodies that include members of rural populations in the South. In practice this is likely to mean encouraging a significant role for non-government organisations on those bodies dedicated to the exercise of some democratic control over the future development and application of nanotechnologies. This is itself likely to be only a further partial solution to the problem caused by the fact that positions of political power tend to be occupied by those who are already powerful, as positions of authority within non-governmental organisations are also likely to be occupied by members of the South who have more in common with members of the North than those around them. The elimination of a North-South divide in relation to control of nanotechnology is unlikely to be achieved until the North-South divide in wealth and power more generally is greatly reduced. However, in order to have any hope of achieving this latter goal, we must try to prevent the development of a North-South nano divide in control producing a divide in the distribution of benefits which would further exacerbate existing inequalities.
As this last observation suggests, the question of the control of nanotechnology is important in part because those who do control nanotechnology will be able to exercise influence over the development and extent of the other divides. Ensuring that the South has real control over the development and application of nanotechnology is likely to be one of the best ways of ensuring that the distribution of access to, benefits of, and profits from nanotechnologies serves to advance the well-being of the majority of the world's population who live in the South.
Political agency in a transnational world
Before concluding, I need to address a common criticism of the scope of the ethical and regulatory project I am defending here. It is sometimes suggested that discussion about the ethics and regulation of technology in a globalised world is moot because the ability of technologies and their consequences to cross borders, combined with the division of the world into sovereign states each with their own regulatory spheres and competing interests, means that no individual polity can reasonably expect to influence the impact of technology on their society (Fukuyama 2003, pp. 187-188) . It is an unfortunate irony that this point is usually made in the context of discussion at conferences and other fora which are intended to do precisely that.
In fact, the claim that we cannot exercise any influence over the future shape of nanotechnologies sits uneasily beside another claim often made at the very same occasionsthat securing the benefits of nanotechnologies requires us to make various changes to the regulatory environment, usually in relation to products and material standards, determinations of liability, and intellectual property (UNESCO 2006, p. 12; Hood 2004) . To the extent that the latter claim is true-which it clearly is, given that the public is unlikely to accept nanotechnologies unless it can be shown to be relatively safe, laboratories are unlikely to research it unless they can patent their ideas, and manufacturer are unlikely to produce it unless they can control their liability-the former claim is false. Both national and international communities have the power to make decisions about technological uptake and trajectories.
Moreover, there are a number of examples of the international community doing exactly that (Fukuyama 2003, pp. 188-189) . The technologies necessary to manufacture and distribute chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons have been more-or-less effectively controlled now for more than 50 years. Few people would accept the argument that the small number of egregious failures in this area mean that we have not been remarkably successful or that we should cease attempting to regulate these technologies. Less dramatically, decisions made at an international level by organisations such as the ISO, WTO, and EU have established standards and intellectual property regimes that have had a determining impact on the forms of, for instance, communications and computing, technology, developed and adopted around the world. International regulation in response to technological innovation is obviously more difficult than regulation within the nation, as there are more interests involved and fewer existing mechanisms to enforce whatever collective decisions are agreed upon. However, the history of the successful regulation of previous technologies suggests that it is not impossible.
Negotiating the nanodivides
The distributive challenge posed by the development of nanotechnologies is more complex than is conveyed by the suggestion that a single "nanodivide" will develop between those who have access to nanotechnology and those who do not. A consciousness of the possibility of such a divide is a useful starting point and a reminder that technological revolutions produce both winners and losers. However, an adequate assessment of the distributive consequences of the development of nanotechnologies requires us to distinguish between the questions of the distribution of access, profit, benefit, and control. Of these questions, the questions of the distribution of the benefits of, and control over, nanotechnologies are, I have argued, the most important, with questions of access and profit being of interest only insofar as they impact on these other goods. Access to nanotechnology may be secured independently of control but may not result in all-things-considered benefits because of the positional nature of many of the goods nanotechnologies contribute to. Profit and control are likely to be linked, with both accruing primarily to wealthy Northern nations. I have also suggested that the future of these nanodivides is likely to be shaped by existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, power, and scientific know-how. For this reason it is likely that significant nanodivides will open in all of the areas I have discussed, except perhaps access, unless a concerted effort is made to prevent this. Yet while I believe the development of these nanodivides to be likely, I should conclude by emphasising that it is not inevitable. While existing historical and technological dynamics may be pushing in certain directions the future development of nanotechnologies will be the result of the sum of human choices. If the nanodivides I have been discussing emerge, it will be as a result of human decisions to act or-perhaps more importantly-not to act to prevent this. Whether such inaction is morally acceptable depends on just how significant we expect the social, political, and economic impacts of nanotechnologies to be. If nanotechnology really is as revolutionary as proponents suggest then both justice and a concern for the stability of any global political order require that we negotiate the challenges of the nanodivides.
